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Abstract

Human resource programs are evaluated by comparing the productivity of
individuals who have benefited from a specific program to the productivity of
similar individuals who have not had this benefit.
To implement such an
evaluation may require a model of the demand of households and individuals for
several distinct forms of human capital, of how public agencies and private firms
work with households to produce these forms of human capital, and of how these
investments increase the lifetime productivity of individuals and thereby
contribute to economic growth and socio-demographic development.
This paper
proposes to estimate an integrated wage function that provides the policymaker
with a basic tool for simulating the private and social returns to human resource
stocks, specifically those in schooling, vocational experience, child nutrition,
migration, adult health and nutrition and family planning.
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I.

Individual Productivity Effects of Human Resources
Human resource programs are evaluated by comparing the productivity of

individuals who have benefited from a specific program to the productivity of
similar individuals who have not had this benefit.

To implement such an

evaluation may require a model of the demand of households and individuals for
several distinct forms of human capital, of how public agencies and private firms
work with households to produce these forms of human capital, and of how these
investments

increase the

lifetime productivity of individuals

and thereby

contribute to economic growth and socio-demographic development.

This paper

proposes to estimate an integrated wage function that provides the policy maker
with a basic tool for simulating the private and social returns to human resource
stocks, specifically those in schooling, vocational experience, child nutrition
(proxied by adult height), migration, adult health and nutrition (proxied by
adult weight given height), and family planning (proxied by avoided unwanted
births).

To complete the task of program evaluation, the policy maker must

provide information on the value of public sector subsidies and private household
resources used to produce the various forms of human capital.
Many studies of education, nutrition, health, labor mobility, and training
have sought to measure the contribution of these forms of human capital to the
productivity of workers and to modern economic growth.

The base of knowledge in

this field is growing rapidly but is unavoidably qualified because returns to
investments in human capital are only realized over a lifetime.
without

true

social experiments

designed to

In addition,

assess how randomized policy

interventions work through the actions of the family and individuals, statistical
estimation of causal relationships may be biased or conditional on hypothetical
structural models.

Microeconomists and other social and biological scientists

have examined the economic and physical functioning of individual workers with
different characteristics, while macroeconomists have analyzed aggregate output,
measures of labor inputs, and the economic growth experience of nation states.
A consensus has been forged that recent periods of sustained growth in total

2

factor productivity are critically dependent on improvements in a population's
nutrition, health, education, and mobility.
Analysis of these forms of human capital must now be integrated to measure
with greater precision their distinct effects on economic development, because
stocks of human capital acquired by individuals may not be independent:

they

potentially interact with each other in their impact on the productivity of the
worker,

and they are often subject to diminishing (or increasing) returns.

Traditional semi-log-linear approximations for wage functions should, therefore,
be extended to more flexible specifications that allow for returns to vary and
interactions to exist among several forms of human capital in addition to
education.
Finally, in considering the effects of human capital on development, we are
primarily interested in how state and family investments influence the formation
of reproducible human capital and how it in turn impacts on labor earnings and
growth.

The exogenous skills and genetic endowments of workers that are largely

unaffected by state and family actions are less central to our objective, except
as they mask or modify measured returns to the reproducible component of human
capital. 1
Figure 1 illustrates the overall system that constrains parents whose
resources and preferences govern,
children's human resources.

for the most part,

investments in their

These human resource stocks are then expected to

influence their children's lifetime productivity, and other outcomes, given the
aggregate economy's derived demand for the different types of labor services the
children can offer.

The objective of the integrated program evaluation approach

1Do the endogenous components of
the variation in human capital exert the
same "effect" on labor productivity as do the exogenous endowments? If they
differ, it is the productive effects of endogenous reproducible human capital
that policymakers need to know. Specifically, much of the variation in height,
for example, is due to genetics. It is not clear whether differences in this
genetic endowment have the same productive effect on workers as do differences
caused by variation in childhood health and nutritional investments.
Specification tests can be implemented to assess whether different sources of
variation in human capital stocks are exogenous or endogenous, and thus whether
specific forms of human capital are justifiably treated as exogenous or
endogenous variables when estimating extended wage functions (Schultz, 1994).

Figure 1: Human Resource Programs and Their Consequences on Productivity
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is to measure two connections:
adult productivity (i.e.,

(i) the impact of the human resource stocks on

wages);

and (ii)

the opportunity cost of social

resources expended on human resource programs (or perhaps infrastructure) to
modify human capital investments.

The social policy maker needs to assess the

social internal rate of return earned by these human resource programs, or the
discount rate that would reduce the present value of the extra wage returns
associated with the human resource stocks to the present value of the marginal
expansion of public subsidies needed to create these stocks.

A number of

conceptual and statistical issues arise in jointly estimating without bias these
two behavioral and technical linkages in a specific setting.

II.

Individual Productivity Function

Social resources are used to produce stocks of human capital that enhance
the productive capacity of the individual over the long run.

How individuals

allocate their productive capacity -- whether they make further investments in
themselves, work in the home, work in the labor market, or engage in leisure
activities -- should not necessarily influence how we measure the private or
social return to that human capital.

Because of the difficulty of assigning a

value to the output of labor in self-employment, home production, or leisure, it
is a common practice to analyze (following a procedure Heckman (1979) first
proposed) the market productivity of persons who work for a wage in the labor
market, and then correct for any bias that may arise from analyzing only this
selected sample.

The critical requirement to correct for sample selection bias

is that there is some observed variable known to affect the probability of
working for a wage, but not to affect the market-offered wage.

The potential

correlation across individuals between the errors in the market wage equation and
the wage participation equation is responsible for the sample selection bias
(Schultz, 1993).
A natural choice for an exclusion restriction that could identify the
sample selection procedure is a variable that affects only the individual's
marginal productivity in nonwage production, or the individual's utility from
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leisure, or both, but is uncorrelated with the market wage.
business assets,

Inherited land,

or wealth raise the individual's productivity in nonwage

activities and thereby decrease the probability she or he would work for others
as a wage earner.

By assumption, these wealth variables have no effect on market

productivity or the wage offer, nor should these wealth variables be determined
by the market wage, or past labor supply and savings behavior. 2
Individuals who are observed not to work for wages are assumed to value
what they produce with their time more highly than the market wages they could
receive .

It is common to assume that the variables which are observed to

.influence market wage opportunities, such as education, also affect nonwage
opportunities, roughly in the same proportion.

Without more information on the

structure of the nonwage production function and the utility function, the market
wage function is assumed to determine the marginal productivity effects in wage
and nonwage activities of human resource investments. 3 These productive effects
are

then

independent

activities.

of how

time

is

allocated between wage

and nonwage

This assumption may be particularly important for evaluating how

human resource programs enhance the productivity of women because only a small
share of adult women in many low-income countries work for wages.

More research

2Actual correlations
do not inform us of the validity of an identification
restriction.
Nonetheless, the expected negative sign of the effect of the
identifying wealth variables in the wage participation equation might be reversed
(to positive) if the wealth variables were in fact endogenous to the household
demand system and reflected the accumulation of wealth from having received a
high wage in the past. In my experience, the land and business asset variables
usually are negatively associated with wage participation in low-income
countries, given the educational attainment and age (i.e., postschooling
experience) of the individual (Schultz, 1993). A positive coefficient for the
wealth variables in the wage-participation function might suggest that this
choice of identifying restriction was invalid.
3 The productivity
of labor in nonwage activities for those who do not
participate in wage activities can be inferred only if the functional form of
nonwage marginal product function is known, and its identifying argument known
and observed. If the underlying nonwage (home) production function is subject
to constant returns to scale, as postulated by Becker (1965), the inframarginal
producer surplus in nonwage production accruing to labor would be zero, contrary
to Gronau's (1977) suggestion.
However, some investigations of wage
participation find that it increases in education, nutritional/health status, and
migration. This could be interpreted as evidence that the marginal productivity
of some human resources is greater in wage than in nonwage activities (Schultz,
1989; Schultz and Tansel, 1992; Schultz, 1994).
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should assess the adequacy of these methods for inferring the productive gains
from human resources.
The wage function is determined by several types of conditioning variables.
First, there are initial abilities, which may be thought of as genetically
determined or at least not affected by the input of family or public resources. 4
Second, there are several dimensions of human capital, which are produced means
of production, formed jointly by family and individual private inputs of time and
goods and by public inputs of goods and services, typically provided in the
region of residence.
constrained

by

The production possibilities to create human resources are

biology,

technology,

and

perhaps,

in

the

short

run,

by

organizational limitations.
The third type of variable entering the human resource production function
is age or experience. 5

Experience acquired after completing school is expected

to enhance initially labor productivity.

Mincer

(1974)

found a quadratic

4
In the initial exploration of variations in the Mincerian wage functions,
much effort went into assessing the bias to the schooling coefficient caused by
the omission from the wage function of the individual's initial ability, or IQ
for short. It is clear that if ability increases the amount of schooling
received, and ability increases productivity holding schooling constant, then the
omission of ability will tend to bias upward the estimated schooling return
(Griliches, 1977). However, subsequent studies have also indicated that using
a variety of family variables in an effort to "pick up" ability and family

effects can introduce an offsetting downward bias on the estimated schooling

return (caused by errors in measurement of the true [quality adjusted] education)
which is larger than the omitted variable upward bias ( see e.g. , Lam and Schoeni,
1993). In the situation being analyzed here, the ability must be exogenous to
the family and public human resource investments. It is difficult to imagine how
the social statistician can measure ability before it is affected by schooling
or by the family's preschool investments in the child's capacities. Because the
ideal experiment to isolate the "ability bias" is so difficult to perform,
considerable analysis has focused on the study of homozygotic twins, who share
initial genetic capacities (e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994).
5Because education
is assumed to be exogenous to the wage function in
Mincer's specification, and age is exogenous, this measure of potential
postschooling experience is exogenous.
The implicit assumption is that all
activities engaged in after leaving school contribute equally to later market
productivity. When experience is adjusted for period of nonparticipation, as
would seem plausible in the case of intermittent female workers, this actual
experience variable becomes endogenous because it depends on lagged labor supply.
If such an actual market experience variable is added to the wage function,
actual experience and such related variables as job tenure must be treated as
endogenous, and estimation may then depend on some (lagged) instrumental
variables that are independent of the current period wage function error but
related to the actual experience variables.
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function in years of potential postschooling experience (i.e., age - years of
schooling - seven or eight) approximated reasonably well U.S. male earnings data
from the 1960 Census.

This quadratic specification could be derived from a model

in which the value of a worker's time invested in on-the-job training declined
linearly with postschooling experience.

With sufficient data, higher-order

polynomials in potential postschooling experience may also be added to improve
the empirical fit of the wage function to wage data. 6
accumulation processes,

For other human resource

such as gestation, birthweight, height, weight-for

height, but probably not migration, biological age may be more relevant than
postschooling experience.

When education is

treated as

endogenous,

then

postschooling experience also becomes endogenous, and experience may be replaced
by an unrestricted polynomial in age.

III.

Types of Human Capital
In this section I propose five forms of human capital that may increase the

lifetime productivity of a worker, although the relative returns to different
types may vary by income and technological stage of the society, and each type
may, after a certain point, be subject to diminishing returns.

The first is net

childhood nutritional status, which is measured by early physical growth and
development, such as height-for-age and weight-for-height.

It is believed that

height at the fourth birthday is already a good predictor of an individual's
final adult height (Martorell and Habicht, 1986).

Adult height is, moreover, an

important

and

determinant

of

adult

productivity,

reemerges

as

inversely

correlated with chronic health problems among the middle-aged and elderly (Fogel,
1991).

Finally, height is inversely related with mortality and consequently

length of productive life.

In addition to improving adult productivity and

6Murphy and Welch (1990) found that a quartic
function was justified in
fitting male wage profiles from large Current Population Surveys from the United
States in the last two decades. The choice of functional form to summarize wage
and earning profiles tends not to be critical, i.e., whether quadratic or cubic.
But if postschooling experience is replaced by age, internal rates of return to
education can no longer be inferred directly from the wage function coefficient
on education, but must be adjusted for different amounts of age for the same
individual. Also, experience tends to fit log wage data better than age, when
both are expressed in quadratic form.
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health, childhood nutritional status may also enhance the performance of children
in school and in early training tasks, and thereby affect the return to other
human capital investment activities (Behrman, 1993; Moock and Leslie, 1986).
Alternatively, the covariation of nutrition and school achievement among children
might be caused by unobserved heterogeneity of families and children, as would
occur if credit constraints or preferences affected families in their investments
in both nutrition and schooling.
Nutritional status in childhood is the sum of several factors, of which
nutritional intake is probably the most important.

Another is the exposure to

infection and disease, which places extra demands on nutritional inputs and
reduces the efficiency with which the body can absorb nutrition, such as through
the incidence of diarrhea, or develop immunities.
place different demands on diet.

The child's work load can also

Poor nutritional status is revealed in adults

who are stunted, or experience a deficit in their mature height.

This adult

measure of height appears to be relatively stable after maturity from about age
18 to 50.
The second form of human capital is schooling.

Children start school at

very different ages, from age 5 to 10, and continue for different numbers of
years, including repetitions.

The length of school terms and the number of hours

a day the school provides instruction varies across and within countries.

The

attendance of "enrolled" pupils during the regular school term is also far from
uniform.

If there were a consensus on how to measure school quality per hour

attended,

this

would

also

exhibit

substantial

variation.

describing investments in schooling by "years completed"

Consequently,

is only a first

approximation that urgently needs to be extended and refined in many directions.
The third form of human capital is migration, which may occur repeatedly
over a lifetime and involve return migration.

To simplify, I focus here on any

movement of adults from their region of birth, which most often occurs in the
first few years after completing school.
more educated individuals (Schultz,
hypotheses.

Migration occurs more frequently for

1982), suggesting again two alternative

Education and migration may be complementary forms of human capital,
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or families that invest more in the education of their children also are more
likely to finance their migration, possibly because they face a lower cost of
investment funds (Becker, 1967), or because they simply have a stronger taste for
child human capital.

Much of the return to education for a rural-born individual

may be realized only through migration, suggesting a close linkage between these
investments (Schultz, 1988a).

Returns to a variety of human resource programs

may therefore be measured more precisely by joint evaluation.

If migration

occurs first in order to continue secondary or higher education, because these
forms of education are only provided in some urban areas, the chronological and
causal order of these two human resource investments may be difficult to
disentangle.

Migration may not be as closely associated with increasing market

productive opportunities for women as for men because families often move
together, and collectively families may assign greater weight in the choice of
destination to the earnings opportunities of males rather than females (Mincer,
1978).
The fourth form of human capital is the means to avoid unwanted fertility,
which enhances women's market productivity by allowing them to continue their
education, to migrate where their skills are most valuable, or to allocate time
to their most rewarding work.

To the extent that public resources that subsidize

family planning and provide associated information about birth control can delay
a woman's first birth or reduce the subsequent number of births, a woman's market
human capital may increase.

Consequently,

the

impact of family planning

subsidies on fertility may be direct and indirect, first helping women avoid
unwanted childbearing, and second enhancing the market productivity of women that
generally leads them to want lower fertility.

It is not surprising that family

planning is viewed as a means to "empower" women because it is likely to increase
their economic opportunities.

Little analytical effort has been directed to

measuring family planning as a mechanism for enhancing women's human capital.
The fifth and final form of human capital is an adult's current nutritional
status, proxied by weight for height squared (BMI), which affects the current
productivity of the individual, particularly at low levels of calories and for
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energy-demanding tasks.

This indicator of nutritional status among adults must

be treated as simultaneously determined with the choice of productive activity,
because increased income can also support increased current expenditures on
nutrition and the performance of more demanding jobs (Strauss, 1986; Pitt et al.,
1990).

Unbiased estimates of the one-directional effect of improved adult

nutrition on wage productivity requires valid instrumental variables that predict
current nutrition or BMI and that are uncorrelated with the error in the wage
function.

The prices of nutrients in the locality or the cost of health care are

possible instruments for this purpose (Strauss, 1986; Deolalikar, 1988; Sahn and
Alderman, 1988).

Poor adult current nutritional status is known as wasting and

is often measured by the BMI (Fogel, 1991).

Because BMI and height are often

nearly orthogonal, both can be used together to explain variation in individual
productivity without the vexing problem of multicollinearity.
Human capital is also accumulated in the form of vocationally relevant
experience.

The actual amount of a worker's time invested in the acquisition of

such skills or even learning-by-doing is difficult to observe and is undoubtedly
an endogenous decision of the worker and perhaps firm.

Consequently, this form

of human capital is imperfectly controlled in the wage function, as discussed
earlier, by an exogenous polynomial in years experience after leaving school or
age (Mincer, 1974).

IV.

Problems in Applying the Framework to Program Evaluation
I have focused on only five human capital stocks to simplify exposition,

to illustrate the potential for integrating human resource program evaluations,
and to offer a concrete specification to guide empirical analysis.
many limitations to such a scheme.

There are

Health is not separately distinguished as a

human resource goal, but the indicators of childhood and adult nutrition are
selected because of their high correlation with childhood and adult mortality. 7
7 There

is some evidence that chronic health problems measured by clinical
investigations among the middle aged may be predicted by adult height (Fogel,
1993). Physical limitations on daily activities are also associated with height
(Stewart and Ware, 1993). The occurrence of acute illnesses among adults can
also be related to anthropometric indicators of health status.
Days ill and
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Although these nutritional indicators are less well documented as predictors of
morbidity, they nonetheless appear to summarize parsimoniously the cumulative
repercussions of disease and nutrition on adult well-being and the quality of
life (Stewart and Ware, 1993; Broome, 1993).
defined

here

to

encompass

explicitly

Human resource activities are

early

nutrition/child

survival

interventions, current nutrition/preventative health measures, education, and
family planning programs.
Labor market mobility as a means for realizing the highest possible returns
on a population's human capital warrants more explicit study as a significant
factor facilitating development. Transportation and communication infrastructure
and reduced regulations on job turnover and residential change are rarely
considered as factors in low-income countries explaining their differential
success in adjusting to short run exogenous shocks due to weather or terms of
trade or longer term effects of technical change or sectoral transformation of
the economy.

Analysis of labor markets, and particularly the determinants of

labor force participation, time allocation,

and migration should be a high

priority for human resource studies within development agencies and governments.
To perform timely assessments of human resource programs, periodic household
labor force surveys will be needed.

These surveys should include human resource

stocks and wages and be in a form to merge with community data on human resource
and welfare programs that influence households in their investments in human
resources.
In estimating a wage function that relates human resource stocks to adult
productivity, several econometric specification issues are paramount.

First,

which forms of human capital are exogenous or endogenous; in other words, are
these stocks uncorrelated or correlated with the unobserved wage determinants
impounded in the error of the wage function?

Characteristics of the region of

residence have been used to identify forces that may plausibly influence the
unable to work in the last month among male wage earners in C6te d'Ivoire and
Ghana are associated with lower wage rates when the individual is working and
reduced likelihood of entering the wage labor force. These measures of acute
illness should be treated with caution, however, because of the subjective nature
of these self-response indicators of health status (Schultz and Tansel, 1992).

12
accumulation of human capital stocks.

The simultaneous determination of wages

and adult weight (BMI) is noted as an instance where the effect of adult weight
on wages could only be estimated by instrumenting weight by local prices of food,
availability of health care, or food-for-work programs for unemployed (e.g.,
Strauss, 1986; Deolalikar, 1988; Deolalikar andGaiha, 1992). Although fertility
and migration are often viewed as choice variables in an economic household
production framework (Schultz, 1974; 1992; Sabot, 1982), few studies attempt to
endogenize migration and unwanted fertility in a wage function. 8

Education is

generally treated as exogenous, but the decision to continue in school is
occasionally modeled along with the wage function conditional on that educational
choice (Willis and Rosen, 1979).

Intergenerational studies of the schooling of

children could treat access to schools and their quality as public program inputs
that may be expected to influence household investments in human resources but
not directly impact on the wages of the children when they are adults.
Programmable policy variations that occur across local areas are thus a
promising source of instrumental variables (IV) to explain the human resource
stocks that in turn serve as arguments in the wage function.
have three advantages and one shortcoming.

These IV estimates

First, if the human resource stock

is measured with classical measurement error, these IV estimates of the wage
function eliminate the resulting measurement bias, which tends to bias the
productivity effect of human capital to zero (Griliches, 1977).

Second, if the

human resource stock is endogenous and correlated with the error term in the wage
function,

these IV estimates are consistent and unbiased in a large sample,

whereas the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are not. 9
problem is that of omitted variables,
dimensions of human capital.

A third standard

such as exogenous ability or other

If these omitted inputs that should be in the wage

8The effect of
one unanticipated birth on the wage of Malaysian women is
estimated to be a 9.6 percent reduction in her wage rate, whereas in the U.S. an
unexpected birth is associated with married women receiving a 9.9 percent lower
wage (Schultz, 1992: Table 5.1).
9 If the explanatory
power of the instruments is relatively weak, the IV
estimates may not be reliable and specification tests will merely confirm
exogeneity due to the poorly identified model (Staiger and Stock, 1994).
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equation are uncorrelated with the included inputs, the OLS estimates of the wage
function are unbiased for evaluating the effect of measured policy interventions.
However, if the omitted variables are correlated with the included variables, a
standardmispecificationproblemmay occur and IV estimates should mitigate this
problem if they satisfy the usual properties (Griliches, 1977; Lam and Schoeni,
1993).

The shortcoming of using local variation in human resource programs to

instrument human resource stocks in the wage function is that the local placement
of programs may be correlated with omitted variables (e.g., healthiness of
environment) or selective migration may occur toward regions with better programs
and thereby affect behavioral outcomes across regions.

Either selective program

placement or migration may bias the IV estimates based on regional programs
(Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986; Pitt et al, 1993).
A central goal of human resource evaluation studies should be to estimate
the wage returns to various human capital stocks that can be augmented by
existing and readily implemented public programs.

Depending on the purpose of

the study and the nature of the program intervention, each form of human capital
may be treated as exogenous or endogenous.

Schooling is conventionally treated

as exogenous following Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974).

Schooling is formed

during childhood when the family of origin exerts considerable control over the
investment decision, whereas the school sets some standards for advancement. The
years of schooling completed appear to augment the productive capacity of a wide
quality-range of students.

Other forms of human capital are perhaps jointly

determined over an adult's lifetime:

such as their allocation of time to market

labor supply;

job search and turnover; migration;

on-the-job training;

fertility (for at least females).

and

These investment-related decisions undertaken

as adults are more plausibly viewed as endogenous to the wage determination
process than schooling itself.
Childhood nutrition and health conditions are summarized by adult height,
whereas adult health and nutrition, are summarized by weight-to-height.

Both of

the nutrition-health proxies have been implicitly assumed exogenous by economic
historians for the purposes of inferring their effect on labor productivity
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(Fogel,

1986,

1994;

Floud et al.,

1990).

But development economists have

recently considered weight and height as potentially endogenous variables in the
labor productivity function (Strauss, 1986; Deolalikar, 1988; Thomas and Strauss,
1993;

Schultz,

1994).

The challenge is to measure the labor productivity

improvements released by short-run and longer run advances in nutritional status,
as proxied by such anthropometric indicators as height and weight.

Would the

reproducible health human capital captured by some of the variation in these
indicators of stature have a distinctively different impact on productivity than
would the genetically fixed endowment of stature that individuals are given at
the time of their conception and then developmentally express?

Growing evidence

suggests that the ratio of weight to height squared (i.e., BMI) and perhaps also
height are appropriately modeled as endogenous human capital stocks, if the goal
of the analysis is to evaluate what human resource programs can contribute to
economic productivity at current levels of human capital development and
technological opportunities. Moreover, if the research goals are to describe the
longer term role of public policies on intergenerational economic mobility in a
society and to quantify the effects of public policies and programs that affect
both childhood and adult investments in human capital, then all forms of human
capital formation should be endogenized (if suitable instruments exit) within the
model and explained by programs and parent endowments.
Another econometric approach to mitigate bias due to omitted variables is
to consider deviations of individuals from the mean of groups that are likely to
share many of the conditioning variables that cannot otherwise be observed and
controlled.

This fixed-effect specification can use panel data for an individual

over time allowing for individual fixed-effects, or it can use special samples
of twins or siblings for which genetic or family factors are eliminated by a
family fixed-effect, or it can use community fixed-effects to remove the bias
from any conditions shared by residents in a region that might be correlated with
variables included in the wage function.

But as community, family,

twin or

individual fixed-effects are added to a wage function to eliminate omitted
variable bias, errors-in-measurement of the human capital stocks becomes a more
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serious limitation (Griliches,
Schoeni, 1993).

1977; Griliches and Hausman,

1986; Lam and

There is no agreement on the optimal approach to dealing with

these many estimation issues but the best choice probably depends on many special
features of the available data and specific goal of the evaluation study.
Some recent studies of wage functions in the United States have relied on
unusual legal provisions surrounding schools in different administrative areas
as instrumental variables for explaining a small fraction of the variation in
educational

attainment of individuals

(Angrist and Krueger,

1991).

This

administratively explained variation is then used to obtain IV estimates for
education in the wage function.

Although these instrumental variables may not

be efficient, with sufficiently large samples from Population Censuses they may
imply statistically significant estimates of the private rate of return to
education (Angrist and Krueger, 1994).

These estimates in several U.S. studies

are close to the simple regression (OLS) estimates of the wage function in the
form proposed by Mincer that treat education as exogenous, measured without
error, and uncorrelated with ability.

One conclusion that might be drawn from

these recent U.S. wage studies is that the bias due to the omission of ability
or family background in estimating wage functions is not as serious as originally
believed.

Moreover, adding further controls in the wage function for family

background can seriously understate the returns to schooling because they
exacerbate the problem of measurement error attached to education.
These various econometric sources of bias in estimating wage functions have
not yet been adequately appraised for the other forms of human capital emphasized
in this paper, such as nutrition and mobility.

Based on recent Living Standards

Measurement Surveys (LSMS) for Ghana and C8te d'Ivoire, education and migration
appear to be exogenous in wage functions, whereas IV estimates appear to be
needed to estimate the endogenous effects of height and BMI on wages of men and
women (Schultz, 1994).

Interaction effects among the human resource variables

are also anticipated from the human capital literature, such as between child
nutrition and education or between education and migration.

Estimation of these

interaction effects among endogenous human resource stocks may clarify whether
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these stocks are technically complements or substitutes for each other in their
effects on labor productivity.

V.

Critical Aspects of Programs to Evaluate

Three questions need to be answered in setting public sector priorities to
help the family invest in human resources and encourage development.

A cluster

of human resource programs needs to be considered together in conceptually
evaluating its benefits for families.

Empirically, evaluations can build on

standard data from household surveys,

matched to data on public resources

provided to community schools, health, and family planning programs, etc.

The

first question is how to get the most benefit from a given expenditure on allied
programs.

This measure of efficiency should explicitly allow for the likely

effects of one program on the outcomes of all other programs, or cross-program
effects.

The second question is how program benefits are distributed across

types of individuals and families, such as the rich and poor, which may inform
us about the equity of the program.

The third question is how the cost

effectiveness of programs would differ if they were in the private or public
sectors.

In many spheres it is difficult to achieve the same efficiency in the

public sector as in the private sector, but the private sector may not be able
to reach the same target groups that the public sector can because of their
different organizational structures and need to collect fees for services.
Benefits from different functionally-oriented programs are difficult to compare,
such as health and family planning.

Much work remains to be done before it is

possible to compare outcome measures, such as a prevented birth, a prevented
death, or reduced morbidity, in comparable welfare units.

The purpose of this

paper is to explore cross evaluation of human resource programs in terms of their
comparative impact on a common objective:

increasing individual productivity.

A framework within which cross-program effects might be measured is
outlined in section 6, and public/private program substitution possibilities can
then be explored in section 7.

The personal distribution of benefits (or costs)

are finally incorporated into this framework in section 8.

It is useful to note
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at the outset that this general approach has two clear limitations.

First, the

distribution of benefits across groups can be readily evaluated only when the
groups are defined in terms of exogenous variables, i.e. , where group membership
is not related to choices and allocational decisions made by the observed
individual and family.

Second, the spatial variation in programs and policies

must be assumed random with respect to unobservables, notably the preferences of
the population and productivity and healthiness of regional environments. 10

VI.

Cross-program Effects and Returns to Scale

Many hypotheses are advanced to explain how and why particular programs
help a family modify its behavior in a manner that is beneficial to the family
and perhaps also to society.

Two distinctive program designs with a shared

objective may strengthen both programs in achieving their common goal, or one may
weaken the independent impact of the other program.

The former, complementary

effects, are most frequently documented across different types of human capital
investment programs.

An explanation for this pattern of reinforcement is that

one form of human capital enhances the returns to another form.

For example,

improvements in child nutrition/health permit children to learn more at school
(Moock and Leslie, 1986; Gomes-Neto et al., 1992), and healthier children can
expect to live a longer, healthier life during which to earn market returns from
schooling (Floud et al., 1990).

The latter, substitution effects between two

social programs, can be expected when the programs are directed to achieving the
same end, but through alternative mechanisms or motivations or instruments, such
as may be the case when public and private sector programs seek to satisfy the
same demands.
These potential synergies between social programs, either positive or
negative, may change with the scale of interventions, possibly reinforcing each
other at low levels and then substituting for each other at higher levels.
10 To

For

deal with the migration of individuals to regions that provide
preferred social programs, or program placement in regions with distinctive
populations or welfare problems, raises identification problems that are
discussed elsewhere (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986;
Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons, 1993).
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example, in a family planning program it may be useful to combine doctors and
nurses

into different types of programs,

some stationary in hospitals and

clinics, while others are mobile in outreach teams.

Both types of program

personnel may be motivated to improve health and reduce the number of unwanted
births,

but

they

use

different mixes

organizational delivery systems.

of

trained manpower

and

different

In some contexts the clinics and outreach

programs may reinforce each other, and in other cases they may substitute for
each other, reducing the effectiveness of the other program.
program effects must be empirically assessed to

Thus, these cross

improve estimates of how

effective public sector program efforts will be in different circumstances.
One simple way to estimate the sign and magnitude of cross-program effects
is to add interaction variables between allied human resource and social welfare
programs to models of behavior or output determination, as, for example, in the
wage function discussed here.

Thus, the wage or fertility of a woman in a region

is expected to be a function of her characteristics and the input of program
efforts per woman in her residential region.

But the program input may be

channeled into either family planning clinic or outreach activities. The wage or
fertility equation estimated by the program evaluator would then include a
separate program input for clinics and outreach, plus an interaction term between
the two regional program activities.

According to the discussion above, the two

segments of the program might be expected to exert positive effects on wages, and
the cross-program effect would be negative if the programs were substitutes, and
positive if they were complements.

The opposite signs would be expected in an

equation accounting for fertility.

An example of this approach applied to the

study of fertility is found in Schultz (1971; 1988b).
Estimates

of such program interaction effects

are more

reliable

if

quadratic terms are also included for the two program effort variables, in which
case the specification can be generally interpreted as a second-order Taylor
series approximation for any functional relationship between the program input
variables and the measure of program output.

With the inclusion of quadratic

terms in each program activity, it is also possible to infer how the returns to
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each program varies with the scale of program effort, and hence how the marginal
returns to program inputs may differ from the average returns.

The objective of

public policy should be to achieve the same marginal return from equal marginal
outlays in various programs, given that both programs have the same objective.
It is a common pattern for the marginal return to program inputs to decline after
some program scale is reached and the demand for the good or service is gradually
satisfied or, in other words, the market is saturated with the relevant skill or
service (Schultz, 1971; 1988b; 1992).
In those instances where the primary objectives of allied social welfare
programs differ, such as with education, health, and family planning, the task
of comparing all returns is not straightforward, but the magnitude of cross
program effects may still be substantial and readily assessed, if not compared
in equivalent monetary terms.

In the previous section I proposed evaluating

human resource programs within a
comparisons.

single wage function to

facilitate

such

A basic feature of many social welfare programs is that they may

influence the costs and benefits of having children (or avoiding unwanted births)
while changing the net benefit streams from investments in the education and
training of those children (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Foster and Roy, 1992).
The most direct route by which public policy may influence fertility is through
the provision of information and related services for evaluation and use of
modern birth control.

If these programs help parents avoid more unwanted births,

the evidence from a number of studies suggests that parents reallocate some of
their gains to investing more in their children's schooling (Schultz, 1992).

If

the income effects associated with the benefits of these types of social programs
were negligible,

then household demand theory predicts

that the estimated

(uncompensated) cross-program effects should be symmetric, or of the same sign
and equal in magnitude.
In the earlier discussion of the wage equation, if the two programs were
health subsidies and school subsidies, the direct program effects are expected
to be positive, and the program interaction effect might be positive as well, if
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they are complementary.

This would imply that health expenditures had a higher

payoff in regions with greater school expenditures, other things being equal.

VII.

Public and Private Program Interactions
Most public human resource programs provide a service that can also be

obtained through private markets, although perhaps in a different quality or
form.

It should be expected that when public subsidies are provided for a good

or service that is also available in the private market, some consumers will
switch from private to public providers because of the public subsidy,
necessarily

changing

outcomes

or

behavior.

Consequently,

the

without

supply

of

contraceptives distributed freely by a public program is likely to overstate the
added

contraceptive

(Schultz, 1971).

protection provided

to

the

population by

the

program

Some contraceptors will merely shift their source of supply

without improving their contraceptive efficiency.

This is of course only a

special case where parallel programs may exist with approximately the same
objective.
a

The only way to assess accurately the effect on contraceptive use of

subsidy to either program is to analyze both programs

overstating public program effectiveness.

together to avoid

Moreover, an analysis should focus on

the final outcome of fertility or female wages, rather than the intermediate
input of contraceptive behavior

(prevalence),

if a more precise measure of

program effectiveness is sought.
In a study of Thai birth rates in 1976-1981,

the fertility effects of

government subsidies to the public sector health and family planning program and
to the private, nonprofit family planning program are estimated.

The study finds

that both the private and public sector family planning subsidies are associated
with lower levels of fertility, holding constant for the age, education, and
household
associated

income
with

administrative

of women.
diminishing

units.

The

larger

returns

In other words,

to

public

sector

program
the

subsidies

scale

marginal

within

returns

in

are

also

province
terms

of

preventing births are smaller than the average returns to government expenditures
per woman.

This form of diminishing returns to scale within provinces was
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evident as early as 1969 in the pioneering Taiwanese family planning program
(Schultz, 1971; 1988b).

In Thailand, the public and private family planning

program subsidies are shown to be substitutes for each other, as might have been
expected (Schultz 1989; 1992).

VIII. Who Benefits from Human Resource Programs
To assess how social program effects are distributed, it is convenient to
add additional interaction variables between program treatments and exogenous
groups.

In the illustrative fertility model,

it has been hypothesized that

family planning provides information and assistance on how to adopt more
effective modern means of birth control.

If it is more difficult for the less

educated women to assess a new birth control technology, and program inputs are
of only little value to the more educated women, public subsidies for local
family planning should then have their greatest impact on the fertility and
productivity of less educated women.

An analogous problem arises where public

sector extension activity promotes adoption by farmers of new technological
inputs and management practices. These farm-extension activities have been shown
to raise the profits of less educated farmers by a greater proportion than the
profits of more educated farmers (Evenson, 1986; Birkhauser et al., 1991).
An interaction variable is defined in this case as the product of the local
region's program subsidy and the individual's education.

It is clearly important

also to hold constant for education and the local level of program subsidy in the
fertility (or wage determining) equation.

If the local input of family planning

activity had a greater beneficial effect in helping women with lower levels of
education avoid

unwanted births,

then

the

estimated coefficient

interaction variable would be positive (negative),

on

this

in the fertility (wage)

equation, while the direct effects of the program and women's education would
both be negative (positive).

This pattern is observed for fertility in Colombia

in 1973 (e.g., Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982) and is generally consistent with the
larger gaps recorded between desired and actual fertility among the least
educated women in Latin America and South East and East Asia in the World
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Fertility Surveys (Schultz, 1989).

The first phase of the In-Depth Fertility

Surveys from three regions of China, collected in 1985, indicate that the partial
effect of a local family planning worker in the community on the fertility of
older women is larger for less educated women.

As in the other studies, both the

woman's education and the presence of a local family planning worker contribute
to lower levels of fertility,

and the family planning worker narrows the

fertility differentials by women's education (Schultz and Zeng, 1991).

In each

of these studies it would be interesting to know if female wages were larger in
those groups in which fertility was lower due to program activity, but many of
the surveys used to study fertility have not collected information on wages or
earnings.

IX.

Conclusions for Program Evaluation

Household survey data from individuals on fertility, child health, child
schooling,

adult education,

wage rates,

and other sources of income,

and

household expenditures can be merged with regional data for the residential area
on public expenditures on human resource programs.

These merged data provide a

flexible and representative basis for assessing the success of human resource
programs to help individuals increase their productivity and families cope with
the challenges of economic and demographic change in the low-income world.
Putting modern technologies to effective use to control their reproduction,
protect their family's health, and educate their children are closely related
achievements that do not proceed independently.

If public objectives can be

achieved by both private and public sector providers of schooling, health, or
family planning, the simultaneous analysis of both public and private providers
is mandatory.

In some parts of the world, the public sector may not be the most

cost effective or equitable provider of basic services, even those that are
traditionally associated with the public sector, such as health care (Birdsall
and James, 1993).

The prices and quality of services in the public and private

sectors should be analyzed together with the traditional household demand data
on expenditures, time allocation, wages, prices, and nonearned income to isolate
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the payoff to expanding public sector subsidies.
The personal distribution of the wage gains from social welfare programs
is rarely estimated but should become an important ingredient in deciding what
goods and services the public sector should provide and to what segments of the
population they should be subsidized.

Subsidies for some public sector services

may benefit predominantly the poor and help them overcome their initial economic
disadvantages.

These subsidies should be associated with families achieving for

themselves greater intergenerational mobility, through their improved control of
unwanted births and the increased health, nutrition, and education of their
children.

Other public sector services,

such as urban hospital care and

university education, may benefit predominantly urban middle and upper classes,
These public services may appear to be inequitable income transfers from
taxpayers to the rich,

without notably affecting average wages, mortality,

schooling, or fertility.

Identifying which public services should become self

financing by fees-for-service may help sustain and expand government assistance
for human resource programs where they remain a cost effective and equitable
human resource investment to increase individual productivity, alleviate poverty,
and accelerate growth.
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